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In one way or another we are all in this room responsible for having given to 
the notion of networks an immense, and some could say, an hegemonic extension. 
Either because some of you have created the hardware and software infrastructure 
that has added digital networks to the already existing water, sewage, road, rail, 
telegraph, and telephone networks, or because others, through media studies, 
sociology, history, political sciences, and even philosophy and brain science, have 
tried to capture what is so original in the new networky world generated by those new 
socio-technical assemblages. The reason why I have welcomed the kind invitation of 
Professor Manuel Castells, is that, because of the very extension of network (as a thing 
of the world as well as a concept), the time has come to check what it really means 
and maybe to shift somewhat its ambition and modify its real import. When a notion 
has become enshrined into a work of art like Cameron’s AVATAR with the planet 
Pandora itself sprouting its billions of web by connections and the very notion of 
                                                
* This paper is the result of a collective work carried out at the médialab of 
Sciences Po in collaboration with Dominique Boullier, Paul Girard, and Tommaso 
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communication among the Na’vis and their creatures being materialized by a real 
plug-in of hair, tails and manes, it is time to stop and ask: “what have we done?” 
I hope you accept that I include myself into this highly professional “we,” not 
because I have contributed anything to the deployment of digital network, not 
because I have studied the extension of the various socio-technical systems of 
information and communication, but because, for about thirty years now, I have 
found in the notion of network a powerful way of rephrasing basic issues of social 
theory, epistemology and philosophy. Consider me, then, as a fellow traveler of the 
various network revolutions (if revolution is the word).  
I am well aware that there is nothing more perilous than an after dinner 
keynote since the speaker is supposed to entertain the audience with witty anecdotes. I 
have chosen another tack: to make it more memorable, I decided to make it as 
earnest and as boring as possible… 
 
In its simplest but also in its deepest sense, the notion of network is of use 
whenever action is to be redistributed.  
This is well known in my field of science and technology studies. Take any 
object: at first, it looks contained within itself with well delineated edges and limits; 
then something happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe, and suddenly you 
discover swarms of entities that seem to have been there all along but were not visible 
before and that appear in retrospect necessary for its sustenance. You thought the 
Columbia shuttle was an object ready to fly in the sky, and then suddenly, after the 
dramatic 2002 explosion, you realize that it needed NASA and its complex 
organizational body to fly safely in the sky —here is the hall where the disjointed parts 
have been assembled for the task force to inquire into what went wrong (Figure 1). 
The action of flying a technical object has been redistributed throughout a highly 
composite network where bureaucratic routines are just as important as equations 
and material resistance. Yes, it is a strange space that of a shuttle that is just as much 
in the sky as inside NASA, but that’s precisely the space—hard to describe and even 
harder to draw—that has been made visible by the deployment of networks in my 
sense of the word. 
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Figure 1. The shuttle flies in space and in the NASA corporate structure. 
 
 
The same transformation has happened in epistemology. I borrow the following 
example from the great historian of science, Simon Schaffer: you believed Newton’s 
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (Figure 2) had been written in the complete isolation of a 
totally bodiless mind, and you suddenly discover that Newton was more like a spider 
in the center of a huge web that covered every possible type of witness carrying and 
sending information back and forth—these are maps of the world with the flags 
representing the precise spots from which Newton requested precise information 
(Figure 3). Here again, the notion of networks points to a transformation in the way 
action is located and allocated. Here again, what was invisible becomes visible, what 
had seemed self contained is now widely redistributed. Newton reaches the stars 
because he is also the center of a vast empire of information. Not because of an 
accident, as in the shuttle example, but, interestingly enough, because of the wide 
transformation in our worldviews that the very notion of network has introduced into 
the new history of science. The search for the production of object and of objectivity 
is totally transformed now that they are portrayed simultaneously in the world and 
inside their networks of production. This is the contribution of my field, science and 
technology studies, of which I am the most proud. 
 
Figure 2. The first English translation of Mathematical Principles (1729). 
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Figure 3. Source of data for Mathematical Principles. Source: Simon Schaffer, The 
Information Order of Isaac Newton's Principia Mathematica, Salvia Smaskrifter, Upsalla 
(2008).  
 
 
You see that I take the word network not simply to designate things in the world 
that have the shape of a net (in contrast, let’s say, to juxtaposed domains, to surfaces 
delineated by borders, to impenetrable volumes), but mainly to designate a mode of 
inquiry that learns to list, at the occasion of a trial, the unexpected beings necessary for 
any entity to exist. A network, in this second meaning of the word, is more like what 
you record through a Geiger counter that clicks every time a new element invisible 
before has been made visible to the inquirer. 
To put it at its most philosophical level (not a thing to do, I know, after dinner 
at night…), I’d say that network is defined by the series of little jolts that allow the 
inquirer to register around any given substance the vast deployment of its attributes. 
Or, rather, what takes any substance that had seemed at first self contained (that’s what 
the word means after all) and transforms it into what it needs to subsist through a 
complex ecology of tributaries, allies, accomplices, and helpers (I chose the word 
ecology on purpose as will be clear later). The shuttle Columbia was not an object 
whose substance could be defined, but an array of conditions so unexpected that the 
lack of one of them (a bureaucratic routine) was enough to destroy the machine; 
Newton’s sublime system was not a self contained substance, but a vast empire of 
information necessary for the system to subsist and expand. Whenever a network is 
deployed, a substance is transformed from an object into a thing, or to use my terms, 
from a matter of fact to a matter of concerns. If we still want to use the term of 
“network revolution,” it is in that sense, I believe, that it can be said to be a revolution 
and clearly a political one. 
 
The ability of the notion of network to follow this strange movement that goes 
from substance to attributes and back, as if you could follow the movement of a fan 
that one could chose to close or to deploy, is at the heart of this rather (in)famous 
social theory known as actor-network theory, abbreviated in the felicitous acronym 
ANT. By the way, I am sorry to say that what I mean by actor-network bears no 
relation with the same term in Barabassi’s LINKED, by which he means the league or 
the union of real actors from nearby Hollywood! No, alas, mine is a purely conceptual 
term that means that whenever you wish to define an entity (an agent, an actant, an 
actor) you have to deploy its attributes, that is, its network. To try to follow an actor-
network is a bit like defining a wave-corpuscle in the 1930s: any entity can be seized 
either as an actor (a corpuscle) or as a network (a wave). It is in this complete 
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reversibility—an actor is nothing but a network, except that a network is nothing but 
actors—that resides the main originality of this theory. Here again, network is the 
concept that helps you redistribute and reallocate action. 
Now, this is where things become complicated and where the digital expansion 
given to information techniques is going to have huge and fascinating effects.  
But before I review some of those effects, I’d like to introduce you to the work of 
the artist Tomas Saraceno because he has offered a powerful view of how networks, 
spheres and tensors could actually fit together (Figure 4). As you may know, one of the 
criticisms often made about networks (particularly by Peter Sloterdijk) is that they are 
extremely poor metaphors since they remain entirely made of nodes and edges to 
which is often added some conveniently drawn potato-like circles (I will come back to 
this impoverished visual vocabulary later). To say that something is a network is about 
as appealing as to say that someone will, from now on, eat only peas and green beans, 
or that you are condemned to reside in airport corridors: great for traveling, 
commuting, and connecting, but not to live. Visually there is something deeply wrong 
in the way we represent networks since we are never able to use them to draw 
enclosed and habitable spaces and envelopes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Art installation by Tomas Saraceno, Venice Biennale.Photo BL 
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Well, the great virtue of Saraceno’s installation (this one in the latest 2009 
Venice Biennale) is that he has managed to obtain comfortable and enclosed spherical 
sites which are nonetheless entirely made of networks. The trick, as you can see, is in 
changing the density of connections until a net ends up being undistinguishable from 
a cloth. And the work of art is even better because neither spheres nor nets are 
actually the real physical thing, which is made of elastic tensors carefully arrayed and 
fixed on the walls. A beautiful case of action being redistributed, since visitors are able 
to check for themselves (when there is no guard around, that is), by pushing or pulling 
a tensor, what else is moving in the whole array. Like his mentor Olafur Eliasson, 
Saraceno is one of those artists who is exploring, often more daringly than social 
theorists, visual possibilities where self-contained substances are captured with their 
attributes fully deployed. This is why they are rightly called “ecological artists.” Is not 
ecology anything but the deployment of all the attributes necessary for any self-
contained entity to subsist? To be self-contained—that is to be an actor—and to be 
thoroughly dependent—that is to be a network—is to say twice the same thing. As 
Gabriel Tarde (a character to which I will come back) said: the reason why this is not 
common sense is because philosophers have been carried out by the verb to be and its 
problem of identity and not by the verb to have and the range of its properties and 
avidities. But the web is changing all of that and fast: “to have” (friends, relations, 
profiles…) is quickly becoming a stronger definition of oneself than “to be.” 
 
I am sorry to insist so much on the conceptual aspect of network, but this is 
because I have found this notion useful long before it gained its new incarnation in 
real life-size nets, webs, and Gaia-like planets (like Earth or Pandora). What I have 
always found great in the metaphor of the net is that it is then easy to insist on its 
fragility, the empty spot it leaves around (a net is made first of all of empty space), the 
subversion it introduces in the notion of distance (the adjectives “close” and “far” are 
made dependant on the presence of conduits, bridges, and hubs), but above all, what 
it does with universality: the area “covered” by any network is “universal” but just as 
long and just where there are enough antennas, relays, repeaters, and so on, to sustain 
the activation of any work. Thanks to the notion of networks, universality is now fully 
localizable. In network, it’s the work that is becoming foregrounded, and this is why 
some suggest using the word worknet instead.  
But what I like most in the new networks is that the expansion of digitality has 
enormously increased the material dimension of networks: the more digital, the less 
virtual and the more material a given activity becomes. Nowadays, everyone knows that 
there is no GPS without three satellites; collective games without fast connections; 
drones in Pakistan without headquarters in Tampa, Florida; bank panic without 
Reuters screens; and so on. When Proust could read a novel alone hidden in the 
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shack of Combray, it was possible to say that his imaginary mental world was virtual, 
but we can’t say that of our kids who have to hook up their modems, buy game 
stations, swap disks and pay their server for a faster connection with our credit card. 
Young Marcel could build castles in Spain (pie in the sky?) for nothing, now he would 
have to buy real estate on Second Life with hard Linden dollars. When Harold 
Garfinkel described the skills necessary to “pass” as a member of a society, you could 
say it was a totally intangible social phenomenon that could be only qualitatively 
described, but not today when every detail of your avatars on the web can be 
counted, dated, weighed, and measured. Then you know that everything that before 
had melted into air has become fully incarnated. Go tell Google engineers that their 
vast arrays of servers are just virtual! This is probably the greatest and yet the least 
celebrated feat of your collective work, Ladies and Gentlemen: to have rendered fully 
visible what is needed to think and to imagine and to trust; to have taught all of us 
that those cognitive competences are now paid in hard won bits and bytes—and have 
become, for that reason, fully describable. 
To sum up: whenever an action is conceived as networky, it has to pay the full 
prize of its extension, it’s composed mainly of voids, it can be interrupted, it is fully 
dependent on its material conditions, it cannot just expand everywhere for free (its 
universality is fully local). Networks are a great way to get rid of phantoms such as 
nature, society, or power, notions that before, were able to expand mysteriously 
everywhere at no cost. As the study of metrology, standards, empires, has shown so 
well, smooth continuity is the hardest thing to get.  
 
I hope you now understand that if we accept to talk about a network revolution, 
it is because of the coincidence between the conceptual notion of network (action is 
radically redistributed) and the rematerialization allowed by digital techniques. As a 
sociologist of sort, I have been especially interested in what this revolution does to 
social theory. And what it does is truly amazing: it dissolves entirely the individual 
versus society conundrum that has kept social theorists and political scientists busy for 
the last two hundred years. To sum up a long argument: we have the social theory of 
our datascape. If you change this datascape, you have to change the social theory.  
Why do we think that they are individuals who are “in” a society? Because of a 
discontinuity in the available data. When we gather statistics—and this is what social 
theorists have done for the last hundred and fifty years when they were not doing 
qualitative field work—the sheer difficulty of getting the data means that you are 
going to focus on the individual as little as possible in order to get as quickly as 
possible at the aggregates. Inevitably, you are going to begin to grant to those 
aggregates some sort of existence by themselves. This is where the notion of society is 
generated, a special way to grasp collective phenomena that Durkheim has defined by 
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the word sui generis or that you find just as well in the tired old cliché that “the whole is 
superior to the sum of its parts.” Once you are there, social theory is finished, 
sterilized for a whole century: you have parts, and you have a whole. And then the 
only remaining question is to find a possible solution to combine or reconcile the parts 
with the whole, a question which, as you know so well in this benighted country of 
yours, is not an academic one since it throws people in the street —as the Tea Party 
movement demonstrates vividly enough. Self-contained individuals fight for a place in 
the self-contained society. 
My claim, or rather ANT’s claim and that of the revisited tradition dating from 
the great French sociologist, Gabriel Tarde, at the turn of the 19thcentury, is that the 
very idea of individual and of society is simply an artifact of the rudimentary way data 
are accumulated (Figures 5 and 6). The sheer multiplication of digital data has 
rendered collective existence (I don’t use the adjective social anymore) traceable in an 
entirely different way than before. Why? Because of the very techniques that you, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, have brought to the world. 
 
 
Figure 5. The Tarde/Durkheim 1904 debate replayed in Paris. http://www.bruno-
latour.fr/expositions/debat_tarde_durkheim.html 
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Figure 6. Map of the blogosphere built around French politics, by RTGI now 
Linkfluence http://fr.linkfluence.net/  
 
 
There is nothing easier now than to navigate back and forth from an individual 
profile to an aggregate of hundreds and thousands of profiles. But the whole novelty is 
precisely in the possibility of going back and forth. Before, in the old days of traditional 
statistics, this was exactly the steps that one could not easily retrace: of course you 
could in principle go back from a compiled questionnaire to the individual tick on the 
form, but the guy who had ticked the form has long disappeared —no inquirer could 
trace it back. Hence a discontinuity, a disjunction introduced in the traceability of the 
associations. The less you can go back to the individual transaction, the more 
tempting it is to give to the aggregate a substantial reality. But today, every one of us, 
because of the navigational movement made possible through the datascapes on the 
screen, is able to reintroduce a continuity from individual contribution to the 
aggregates in a much more smoother way than before. (The experience is possible 
only in front of the screen; it’s much harder to keep this focus on a piece of paper, and 
this is why it is not described so much). 
 
And what is the result of this new habit of navigating back and forth through 
datascapes without stopping at either of their two end points? Well, the two extreme 
points at which the whole of social theory had solidly fastened their Big Questions —
that is, the individual versus the society, who should take precedence, and how power 
is exerted from one to the other, and so on and so forth— begins to lose their 
undisputed privilege and even, after a while, vanish away. Instead of THE individual 
versus society Problem, we are now faced with the multiple and fully reversible 
combinations of highly complex individual constituents and multiple and fully 
reversible aggregates. The center stage is now occupied by the navigational tools.  
I believe it is the unique and unexpected combination of, first, the datascapes, second, 
the navigation skills acquired on the screen, and, third, actor-network theory, that has 
totally redistributed the classical arguments of a society made of individuals. (It is not 
a small paradox that this alternative theory of the social had been anticipated a 
century ago by Gabriel Tarde, a keen connoisseur of contemporary statistics who had 
detected immediately in the project of his young colleague Emile Durkheim the 
danger of introducing much too fast a discontinuity between two levels: that of 
individual psychology and that of a sui generis society—and the perversity of their 
debate is that it is Durkheim, the one who invented the two levels principle, who has 
been able to persuade his readers that it was Tarde who occupied one of the two 
positions, that of individual psychology, whereas Tarde had, on the contrary, denied 
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that there were two levels and tried to bypass entirely the two end points of 
individuals and society. Needless to say Durkheim won and Tarde lost, until, that is, 
the web came in to vindicate him by offering at last, if I dare say so, a non-
individualistic grasp on the individual!). 
 
The reasonable thing for me to do, so late at night, would be to stop there and 
to crack a few jokes to help you digest your dinner before having a sip of cognac. And 
yet, I cannot resist the temptation to explore further with you some of the odd 
consequences of this redistribution of action allowed by the concept of network 
combined with the development of digital datascapes. I am afraid cognac will wait a 
bit. 
Even though it seems commonsense to say that the whole is superior to the parts, a 
minute of reflection is enough to realize that this is due to the introduction of the 
discontinuity in data collection I mentioned earlier: you notice individuals reduced to 
very few properties walking or working in downtown Los Angeles; then you look at 
the huge skyscrapers that tower above them; and then it seems reasonable to say that 
“the whole is superior to the parts,” or that there emerge out of individual interactions 
many things that the individual had not anticipated. . Possibly. But this does not mean 
that at some point the action of individuals has been taken over ex abrupto by some sui 
generis entity that could be called Los Angeles society. That is precisely the point that 
Tarde always objected to with Durkheim: we know from firsthand experience that 
this never happens. It does not mean that there is no society and only individuals (an 
accusation leveled at Tarde by Durkheim), it means that the two notions are the two 
faces of the same coin and this coin has no more currency any more than a French 
franc. 
 To believe in the existence either of individual or of society is simply a way to 
say that we have been deprived of information on the individuals we started with; that 
we have little knowledge about their interactions; that we have lost the precise conduits 
through which what we call “the whole” actually circulates. In effect, we have 
jettisoned the goal of understanding what the collective existence is all about. Is it not 
strange to imagine a science of society making sure that its main phenomenon will be 
forever rendered impossible to detect and to document?  
Now suppose that we benefit, thanks to digital techniques, from a vast range of 
information about individuals. Let us be careful here: by individual I don’t mean the 
individual atoms deprived of most of their properties and rendered fully 
interchangeable before they enter into “interactions”. Instead of those atomic 
individuals of the past, we now possess individuals for which we are allowed to 
assemble profiles made of long lists of properties. Nothing is more common on the web 
than this explosion of profiles willingly or unwittingly accumulated, stored, treated, 
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and visualized. Until the digital techniques of capture and storage, many fields of 
social sciences, as you know, had been divided between qualitative and quantitative 
research (I am myself a qualitativist having done mostly field work). But individual 
profiles begin to seriously blur the distinction between the two sets of skills. Contrary 
to common wisdom, and exactly as predicted by Tarde, the more you individualize the more 
you can quantify —or else we have to find another name than quantification to describe 
the phenomenon (is quali-quantitative a possible term?). 
Why is it that the substitution of long and complex individual profiles to that 
atomic individual generates such a difference in the actor/system conundrum? 
Because when we begin to gather profiles, the very notion of interaction begins to 
wobble. The reason is that a given individual will be defined by the list of other 
individuals necessary for its subsistence. This is the reversibility of actor and network 
mentioned earlier, or that of substance and attributes. Every individual is part of a 
matrix whose line and columns are made of the others as well. To take the example 
not of downtown Los Angeles but of the recently rediscovered METROPOLIS, it would 
be easy to build a database where Freder Fredersen is defined as son of the Joh 
Fredersen, loves Maria, befriends worker n°1255, etc., and then to ask any good 
social network software to automatically permutate for you the positions so that Joh 
Fredersen will in turn also be defined as the father of Freder, the enemy of Rotwang 
and of Maria, etc., etc.  
If we pursue this thought experiment we realize that we have already solved (or 
rather dissolved) one of the classical problems of social theory: the reason why people 
said that interactions create phenomena superior to the individual social atoms, is 
because they had first defined the atoms as self contained entities deprived of all the other 
entities necessary for their subsistence (they had failed to see actors as actor-networks). 
No wonder that then, when entering any interaction, those simplified and castrated 
atoms had produced unintended consequences: too little was known about them in 
the first place! Strictly speaking, it is not true that there are interactions between 
individuals. Individual action is much too distributed to be defined in terms of 
interaction. This is one of the first strange consequences of taking seriously the notion 
of actor-network. 
But the second consequence of gathering so much information about individual 
profiles is even stranger: the very notion of the whole begins to be deeply modified. 
What is a collective phenomenon once you deploy all the information you have about 
individual associations? It is certainly not something superior to the web they form by 
sharing their profiles. What is it then? Probably something inferior, something smaller 
than the parts. This is what Tarde always objected to with Durkheim: the whole is 
necessarily less complex than the individual who makes it possible, provided, that is, 
you accept not to reduce individuals to self-contained atomic entities but let them 
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deploy the full range of their associates—which means of course that you need to 
have a lot of information about their profiles.  
This argument seems bizarre only because we are used to the three usual 
metaphors that have been developed over the course of the centuries to talk about 
collective phenomena: (a) a society overarching individuals—the organicist metaphor; 
(b) an invisible hand producing optimum out of simple minded atomic calculators—
the economic metaphor, or (c) an emerging structure—the auto-organization 
metaphor. All of those start with atomic individuals and imagine a second level where 
the collective phenomenon takes over. But it might be the time to imagine other 
metaphors where there is only one level, where the parts are actually bigger than the 
whole and where a phenomenon can be said to be collective without being superior to 
individuals. A better metaphor would be the one that would rely for instance on the 
ways in which standards circulate through the net, or fashion, buzz, epidemics, that is, 
just the sort of things that are now easy to detect, to follow and to visualize with the 
new digital tools made available (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Network datascapes illustrating phenomena in which the collective is not 
superior to the individuals. http://www.visualcomplexity.com/vc/ 
 
You are going to tell me that this kind of information on the building of 
downtown Los Angeles that I took as my example is totally inaccessible so that my 
thought experiment is just that, a thought, not an experiment. Maybe, but it is not the 
same thing to say that because of a lack of information we speak as if there was a 
whole superior to the parts, or to say that the great problem of social theory is to 
“reconcile the actor and the system”. What is shut close with the second formulation 
is wide open with the first. And I could add that there exist many sites where we do 
have this information for instance in the artificial worlds of SIMCITY. Or, even more 
tellingly, in the many efforts of many interesting radical architects, planners, and 
builders to devise digital platforms to resolve the question of collective or participatory 
design.  
There is something always fishy and I believe deeply wrong in the idea of a 
whole superior to its parts. I have always the feeling that we have not moved much 
from Menenius Agrippa’s famous simile of “the Members and the Belly”. Remember 
CORIOLANUS. If you accept the notion of organism as something different or superior 
or even emerging, you lose what an organization is (and I would add you ruin the 
possibility of doing politics). A phenomenon may be collective without being social. 
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The reason I insist on this far-fetched argument is that it opens a much more 
interesting collaboration between sociologists and for instance biologists fighting 
against the equally misleading notion of an organism (organizations and organisms 
share the same paralyzing social and political theory) or between sociologists and 
neuroscientists. Since there is no conductor, nor homunculus, nor sui generis society 
anywhere, we might be able to collaborate more effectively by following the right 
conduits through that which appeared before as a whole above parts but is actually a 
part, primus inter pares, so to speak, that traverses through the parts. The problem is the 
same in a brain, in a body, in a city. Yes, networks are everywhere but not quite in 
Barabassi’s generalization of a world made of links. Rather in the neo-Leibnitizian 
meaning of the word that Tarde had resurrected under the name “monads.”  
There is something actually very bizarre in the attempts to apply models 
borrowed from natural sciences to social phenomena. Too often, physicists or 
biologists, try to make individual human atoms just as simple minded as atoms in 
physics or ants in entomology. Now, I have nothing against models (in my médialab 
we are actually trying to model Tarde’s idea of a whole smaller than the part society). 
But is it not strange to claim to imitate the natural sciences while doing just the 
opposite? What is so striking in human societies is how much information is available 
on individual profiles; so it is a bit silly to say nonetheless that we should start with 
interchangeable atoms. A reasonable and apparently fully scientific way would be to seize 
the opportunity offered by the mass of information now available. And yet, what is 
done instead? The humans (on which masses of information are available) are treated 
as atomic morons on which as little as possible is known, by endowing them with as 
few rules of behavior as possible, so that they generate through their “interaction” (a 
loaded term as we just saw) as complex a structure as possible. And all of that in the 
name of imitating for instance the study of ants (I mean the real ones not ANT!).  
But when entomologists made the startling discoveries that they could explain 
the building of elaborate structures such as the anthill without relying on any notion of 
superorganism, this is exactly what should be done with human societies. With this 
important difference that humans dispose of billions of neurons and not tens or 
hundreds of thousands like social insects. So, what does it mean to really imitate the 
natural sciences: is it to start from humans with billions of neurons about which we 
possess elaborate profiles in huge databases and then strip them bare so that they end 
up looking like ants? Or is it to do exactly as it has been done with ants, that is get 
entirely rid of the notion of superorganism and even of that of two levels, and to try to 
see how those monads manage to build elaborate structures without ever relying on a 
whole superior to the parts?  
The true digital revolution in social theory is to open a way whereby it is 
possible to study the individuals and their aggregates without relying at any point on 
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two levels, without accepting any discontinuity where the individual action disappears 
mysteriously into a sui generis structure. I really believe, Ladies and Gentlemen, that if 
we succeed in doing this we will achieve for human societies discoveries just as 
revolutionary as what has been done with insect societies—and without in the least 
looking reductionist since we will not have to commit the rather silly mistake of 
discarding all the available information to limit humans to ants or atoms just because 
physicists and biologists like to have masses of interchangeable elements for their 
models. Why not trying to move from complexity—the parts—to simplicity—the 
whole—instead of doing the opposite? Since the information is here why not use it? 
 
Actually, there are good reasons for not using it, and I will end this lecture with 
two of those, just in case you find yourself too excited about the prospect I am offering 
you… 
 The first is the one I alluded to earlier: the mass of data available is accessible 
through an incredibly poor visual datascape. Actually, the word datascape is somewhat 
of a misnomer. It is not a pleasant landscape, but rather like watching lines and lines 
of barbed wire. How tiring it is to ponder click after clicks all those nodes and all those 
edges and all those potato shaped lines. When Tarde predicted, a century ago, that 
when statistics would be really good, social phenomena would be as pretty and easy to 
look at as the flight of a swallow, how disappointed he would be to look at the anemic 
spaces of the web. It is called “visual complexity” but it is actually not complex at all, 
nothing at least like the sight of a flying swallow. Poor and boring and even when 
agitated by flashy and sexy moving gadgets it is just as informative as the reading of 
tea leaves. I don’t want to sound too impolite, Ladies and Gentlemen, but I think you 
could do much better! The whole world is expecting from you visual instruments 
which are at the level of the extraordinary transformations brought about by the 
traceability of collective phenomena and compatible with our very efficient visual 
skills. It took about eighty years for statistics to become a vocabulary for doing social 
sciences. We should be able to speed up the time necessary to transform the mass of 
quali-quantitative data into agreed upon and comfortable looking datascapes. Which 
of course means that we should be able to solve the question of compounding masses 
of individual profiles in a fully reversible way, that is exactly what traditional statistics 
have not been able to do. 
Now, the difficulties of realizing those major transformations in visualization 
and computing are compounded by another even more formidable challenge. We 
should be able to navigate through datascapes which are not only visually coherent 
but which are also able to follow controversies. This is what I call solving the 
Lippmannian problem (that problem that Walter Lippmann addressed so well in his 
masterpiece THE PHANTOM PUBLIC). The social theory question of bypassing the 
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individual versus society is exactly paralleled by the epistemological question of obtaining 
authority while bypassing the distinction between rational and irrational voices. It is 
actually twice the same problems and this is why their connection is at the core of 
ANT. The recent climategate fracas is a good case in point: how do you map the 
controversy around the evolution of climate without resorting either to conspiracy 
theories or to the positivist narrative that Earth’s climate speaks directly to the GIEC’s 
scientists much like Eywa speak to the Na’vis? Two types of fundamentalisms which 
are fiercely opposed because they resemble themselves so much: a self-contained 
authority that would need no network of attributes to be sustained? So much talk 
about sustainable development, and so little attention given to what makes argument 
sustainable! 
I have been directly engaged in this last question through the creation of my 
school, the tiny tiny médialab, the fifteen year development of a course called 
“cartography of scientific controversies,” and a now finished European project call 
MACOSPOL (MApping COntroversies on Science for POlitics) to try to develop a 
platform for making comfortable for scientists and users of scientific data the 
navigation through controversial datascapes. If I wanted to dramatize somewhat the 
general problem we all face, I would say that what we have to do is to reinvent the 
newspaper in a completely new form (this is why Lippman’s wisdom is so important). 
If it is true, as many historians have shown, that there is a direct link between the 
invention of the newspaper and the possibility for citizens to articulate political 
opinions, and if it is true that the old newspaper appears retrospectively as a platform 
connecting heterogeneous data, then it is extremely urgent to reinvent a platform no 
longer on paper but in the newly rematerialized world of digital datascapes. Digital 
democracy has generated a lot of hype, but I believe, as many of you here, that its 
true development is still to come and that it will be necessary to invest also, in no 
small part, in the theoretical import of the notion of network as this conference 
proposes to do. When Lippmann said the public is a phantom, this was not a way to 
say it does not exist, but on the contrary a plea—and a somewhat desperate plea—to 
make it appear through the invention of the right tools. It is only because of the 
importance of the task at hand and of the seriousness of the challenge that I have 
taken the liberty tonight of submitting to you those remarks on the theory of network, 
fully conscious that you know infinitely more than me on those various challenges but 
equally conscious that not one of them can be met without a collaboration between 
many various fields including philosophy. Thank you very much Ladies and 
Gentlemen for your patience. 
 
 
 
